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UNIFICATION OF POLITICAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
P L OLITICAL" and "legal" are different words, and it 
J7~is possible that they refer to two disciplines whose 
unification suggests subsuming one under the other 
or treating them as co6rdinate branches of a "master science". 
If we exclude the reduction of social data to their physical 
components or external manifestations, as well as formal ex- 
ercises designed to unify the social sciences by conventional use 
of common terms regardless of the distinctiveness of problems, 
we encounter such a disorganization in current thought as to 
make it obvious that there are major obstacles in the way of 
even a loose interrelation of legal and political theory. 
In the writer's view of the present situation political theory 
and legal theory do not exist as autonomous disciplines. Nor 
can they be constructed into or developed as separate disciplines 
unless arbitrary limitations are imposed, for example, that legal 
theory be confined to the explication of legal rules and to their 
logical manipulation, while political theory include all of social 
science regarding relevant facts and values. The long tradition 
of political valuation under the aegis of the natural law phi- 
losophies and the rise of sociology of law alone render such a 
demarcation untenable and indicate that the problems met in 
even a casual survey of legal theory and political theory cannot 
be solved that way. 
There are many other reasons for thinking that the present 
division of knowledge into political theory and legal theory 
represents an unsound bifurcation and that the most promising 
endeavors lie in the direction of uniting these cognate bodies of 
thought. Perhaps it may be assumed that efforts to do this 
would profit from significant achievements in the social sciences 
and that no mere application of ancient philosophies will suffice. 
Having noted this caveat, the writer ventures to suggest, 
without undue commitment to either Plato or Aristotle, that a 
study of the problem in the context of these philosophers' work 
would be profitable. No separation of legal from political 
theory is found there, and in their analysis of problems the legal 
15 
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16 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY (VOL. LXIX 
and the political coalesce as the subject matter of the "master 
science" (for example, Aristotle's comment that the constitution 
is "a way of life"). The pertinent question concerns the validity 
of that perspective and its present significance rather than the 
limitations of Greek social science, including those reflecting 
the absence of a highly developed legal order. 
The contrast in present legal and political theory is obvious 
and some of the causes must be noted in an effort to achieve a 
sound point of view regarding law-and that, in the writer's 
opinion, is a necessary prerequisite to the solution of the problem 
we are discussing. In this century and country vocationalism 
has greatly influenced, if it has not wholly determined, the 
functions of scholars designated "legal" or "political" in the 
respective departments of the universities. For example, the 
government curricula typically omit private law, procedure, 
and even areas of important public law-and that is justifiable 
only on vocational grounds. Vocationalism is so dominant in 
the law schools that the solution of practical problems is em- 
phasized even in jurisprudence. It seems evident that the 
prevalent bifurcation in thinking has been influenced by the 
vocational work of the scholars. 
Equally operative in effecting the separation of legal from 
political theory has been the accelerated specialization in social 
science which began in the past century. It is impossible here, 
however, to deal with the emergence of the various disciplines 
or to consider the advantages of the specialization they represent. 
Finally, the theory that law is only a distinctive form or type 
of proposition, also dominant in the modern era, has allocated 
the determination of legal meanings to one group of specialists 
and has deterred nonlegal scholars from exploring them. At 
the same time, with the support of a narrow empiricism, it has 
induced the assumption that law is not important in behavioral 
science. Thus, the far-ranging influence of formal theories of 
law, specialization and vocationalism has largely determined 
the present character of legal theory and political theory. Any 
effort to unify them must find ways to surmount the consequent 
barriers. 
For those who hold that any body of knowledge is conditioned 
by its subject matter and that the various sciences are distin- 
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guishable in those terms, the discovery and definition of the 
distinctive properties of a subject matter are of paramount 
importance for the theory of the relevant discipline. For present 
purposes one may recognize three kinds of definition-the 
Humpty Dumpty definition, that of usage, and the descriptive 
definition which specifies "essential" properties and is fully for- 
mulated at the end, rather than at the outset, of an inquiry. 
The literature of political theory on the subject matter of the 
discipline exhibits the use of all these types of definition, often, 
unfortunately, without stipulation of what is being done. 
Humpty Dumpty definitions are sometimes necessary in 
scientific or philosophical enterprises where ordinary usage is 
cloudy and knowledge of the realities must be postponed. But 
a reckless coinage of terms handicaps the acquisition of knowl- 
edge by confusing verbal construction with analysis and theory. 
In any case, the descriptive definition is the principal objective 
of inquiry regarding the subject matter of the political discipline. 
It should be sufficiently precise to facilitate research and, so far 
as is possible without distortion, it should be stated in terms 
which promote the organization of the relevant knowledge. 
It is widely recognized that various current efforts to define 
the political field have met with an indifferent success. One 
common ''approach" is that power is the political subject matter. 
But power, unqualified and unspecified, is one of the vaguest 
notions in the history of human thought, and one need only 
note the ramifications of potentiality as distinguished from 
actuality in Aristotle's metaphysics, alone, to apprehend the 
range of problems raised and unsolved by venturing in that 
direction. That perspective, moreover, is apt to intrude phys- 
icalist or biological assumptions and to ignore problem-solving 
intended to discover the "right" laws rather than to dominate. 
The notion is thus fostered that the political situation is correctly 
represented in the image of a dominating leader manipulating 
stupid or cowering "subjects". But disinterested efforts to 
discover what is really wanted and what ought to be done and 
the answers implemented in functioning legal systems reveal 
the more enduring, significant aspects of power relations.' 
1 
"Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties. . . 
John Locke, Second Treatise on Government, Book II, Ch. 1. 
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Another approach is that the subject matter of the political 
discipline is decision-making. There is a significant degree of 
relevance in this generalization just as there is in the one con- 
sidered above but, again, the avoidance of law results in a vague 
notion which apparently includes attendance at a baseball 
game, by-laws of unions and corporations, participation in 
church activities, decrees of ecclesiastical authorities, criminal 
behavior, and the judgments of courts of law. If inquiry were 
limited to rational processes, as the term "decision-making" 
suggests, there would be a failure to take account of custom and 
habituation in the moral virtues manifested in hardly conscious 
correct action, as well as of self-interest, lack of information, 
and bias. Nor is the knowledge required to construct the 
discipline rendered more attainable by confusing the processes 
involved in learning legal ways with those involved in discovering 
sound laws and those involved in adjudication and those involved 
in law enforcement. 
Similar doubts arise regarding the thesis that the authoritative 
allocation of values is the subject matter of the political discipline. 
Difficulties concerning the meaning of "authority", alone, and 
the effort to define that in terms of acceptance of an obligation 
to obey merely raise many problems, which could probably be 
solved in good measure by precise analysis which recognized 
that law is an essential component of the political process, and 
included careful efforts to distinguish laws from other norms. 
The above remarks are even more pertinent to the thesis that the 
subject matter of politics is "the control relationships of wills."2 
With reference to all of these approaches to the discovery and 
definition of political data, it may be suggested that if something 
other than law is intended in the above generalizations, their 
authors should state clearly just what that other is, and why 
law is omitted. If law is included, but something in addition 
is intended, it is equally necessary to state what else is included 
and why that is done. The principal limitation of such theorizing 
is that it lacks definite relevance and the support of validated, 
narrow generalizations because law has been ignored. Thus, 
2 George E. G. Catlin, A Study of the Principles of Politics (New York, 1930), 
p. 76. 
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even though one might eventually employ similar theories, they 
would have much greater significance if they rested on, and rose 
from, the solid foundation of a precisely defined, distinctive 
subject matter. While these remarks refer especially to certain 
recent theories, they are also applicable to more historically 
guided interpretations which have suffered from a neglect of 
thorough study of legal ideas and their functions-with the result 
that an unnecessary vagueness pervades the literature, and the 
potentialities for systematizing the political discipline are not 
developed. 
The writer submits that the traditional view that the state 
is the subject matter of the political discipline is basically sound.3 
The correlative thesis that the state presupposes, or is identical 
with, law, though involved in verbal difficulties and the un- 
certainties of anthropological studies, is also one of the most 
widely held opinions in the history of political theory, beginning 
with Plato's observation that without law there is no polity. 
In the light of current attempts to discover and define the 
subject matter of the political discipline without reference to 
either state or law, it may not be superfluous to recall that 
throughout the history of political theory, even in sweeping 
challenges like those of Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Hume,4 
law was recognized as an essential component of political data. 
It is conceivable that the history of political theory regarding 
law represents an obsession with irrelevant or nonsensical ab- 
stractions but, apart from the weight of 2,300 years of precedent 
and authority, the literature produced abounds in valuable 
insights and critiques of political processes which can hardly 
be displaced by wishful prognostications regarding a nonexistent 
political science. 
In addition to the evidence of the history of political theory 
recognizing law among the essential components of political 
3 It should be clear from the following discussion that the writer does not hold 
that political science or theory should be limited to "the state". 
4 "So great is the force of laws, and of particular forms of government, and so 
little dependence have they on the humors and tempers of men, that consequences 
almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced from them, as any which 
the mathematical sciences afford us." David Hume, Philosophical Works (Boston 
and Edinburgn, 1854), vol. 3, pp. 12, 13. 
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data, there is considerable knowledge of the formal organization 
of many societies. The identification of law and state with 
highly specialized official organs has retarded solution of the 
problem whether the simplest preliterate peoples were without 
law or whether the more persuasive view is ubi societas ibi jus. 
But even those who withhold a "state" from preliterate societies 
find law or other coercive norms among them; and, although 
the consistency of that view may be doubted, it provides a 
common ground so far as the present thesis regarding law is 
concerned. 
The principal point, however, is that it is not sufficient merely 
to recognize that law is somehow or somewhere present among 
political data. The needs of cogent theory are met only if law 
is found to be "ultimate" and "essential" in political data. 
Law is ultimate and essential in political data not for the col- 
lateral reason that it is impossible to reduce law to simpler 
elements without destroying it but because law supplies and 
comprises the distinctiveness of political data. In short-no 
law, no political data.5 
To secure an adequate hearing for this thesis it would be 
necessary to place alleged instances of total personal domination 
in actual contexts of sustaining legal orders-to consider, for 
example, whether the historic Oriental despotisms rested on a 
base of customary law, and to detail the facts of the recent and 
current dictatorships, including that avowing the theory of the 
withering away of the state-all of which preserved the Rechts- 
staat throughout vast areas of interpersonal relations which did 
not challenge the regime. The expansion of state and law in 
Russia, as well as the liquidation of distinguished exponents of 
the Marxian theory, is especially suggestive. The plain inference 
is that law is necessary because order and security, the minimal 
requirements of survival, not to speak of liberty and other values 
of democratic societies, cannot be provided without law. The 
testimony of the history of law and of political theory, of an- 
6 "Legal action-we may also call it 'political' for, as it will be argued later, 
the political is also the legal, since the State is essentially law...." Ernest 
Barker, Principles of Social and Political Theory (Oxford and New York, 1951), 
p. 45. 
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thropology, and of current events may be merely collateral 
evidence, but they are rather persuasive that law is an essential 
component of political data. They provide some insight into 
the primordial fact of law in enduring interpersonal relations. 
From a directly theoretical viewpoint, law is ultimate and es- 
sential because it includes, if it does not consist only of, distinctive 
ideas, that is, law is ultimate in political data because distinctive 
ideas, supplied by law, are ultimate there. Until, therefore, 
the search for a valid, adequate definition of political data is 
pushed to the point where those ideas and their functions are 
included, the basic properties of those data have not been ap- 
prehended. 
There is still another way to recognize the place of law in 
society and in the political discipline, namely, to think of the 
political process in terms of social problems. In the literature 
of sociology, social problems are apt to be given a merely practical 
significance and such theory as is expended on them deals with 
the articulation of assumed value judgments and the possibility 
of improvement. What has been ignored is that social problenms 
are legal problems. For, in so far as social problems are recur- 
rent, more or less regular modes of dealing with them are sought, 
that is, the solutions include sound laws, as is evident in the work 
of the English Royal Commissions. For Plato the solution of 
social problems and the consequent view of law as therapy are 
subordinated to attainment of the highest type of wisdom ex- 
emplified in legal codes and constitutions. From both view- 
points law is "basic", and the inadequacy of that adjective and 
its synonyms is the unavoidable consequence of contact with an 
irreducible facet of social life. 
If the state is the subject matter of political theory and if the 
state presupposes law or is identical with law (though not in the 
sense maintained in the Pure Theory of Law) or if state and 
law are not thus related, but law is nonetheless recognized as an 
essential phase of enduring social organization, then the most 
important present task for theorists is to study the meaning and 
functions of law from the vantage point of current social science. 
This will certainly represent a great advance in comparison with 
past political theory which accepted a restrictive view of law, 
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for it will provide the modern social scientist with data and 
theories with which he can work. 
It would require a lengthy essay to present an adequate 
theory of law, but the directions to be taken can be indicated. 
We start from what is common ground for practically all theorists 
from the Greeks to the current positivists, namely, that law 
is expressed in a distinctive normative form composed of two 
descriptive propositions, one designating a harm, the other, a 
physical sanction, both being joined by a copula signifying must, 
an imperative "shall". The second step concerns the teleological 
quality of these norms and their embodiment of, or relation to, 
values. Finally, there is a factual dimension of law manifested 
in conduct and institutions which express the legal ideas, and 
in artifacts into which those ideas are read. Admittedly, there 
are troublesome questions to be dealt with in connection with 
the two latter, alleged properties of law, and there are many 
subsidiary problems concerning, for example, the norms of sub- 
groups and the sanctions of different types of norm. Nonethe- 
less, the principal outcome of the suggested integrative theory,6 
without further specification of the various steps, is that laws 
are distinctive cultural facts. A rational-empirical discipline 
is thus envisaged in which the political is not separated from 
the legal except as convenience and the division of labor suggest 
practical allocations of study. 
This is not the place to argue the merits of the above and 
other theories of law or to demonstrate that the bifurcation of 
its form, value and fact in particularistic analyses of the data 
has reflected and determined a corresponding separatism in the 
relevant knowledge. The way to raise such controversies above 
the level of verbal differences or merely preferential attitudes 
is to be governed by the facts and qualities of most actual, 
enduring power norms as they are revealed in history, and to 
keep in mind, also, the requirements of a relevant social discipline 
as distinguished from those of a formal science. 
To evaluate theories of law it is also necessary to recognize 
that definitions of law have been proposed in various contexts 
6 The writer has discussed this in "Integrative jurisprudence", published in 
Interpretations of Modern Legal PhilosoPhies, edited by Paul Sayre (New York, 
1947), p. 313, and in Living Law of Democratic Society (Indianapolis, 1949). 
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and for different purposes. There is, accordingly, little to be 
gained in asking in the abstract-"What is law?" Necessary 
limitations on inquiry include the following. There is the 
lawyer's definition of law, in which social practices, approval, 
and ethical validity may be irrelevant because the lawyer's 
purpose is to estimate the likelihood of governmental coercion 
in particular situations. The question for theory in this con- 
nection is to discover to what extent avowedly scientific defini- 
tions of law, for example those of legal positivism, have been 
unduly influenced by the needs of litigants, judges and lawyers. 
Second, in debates on obedience to government, definitions of 
law have emphasized conformity with, or inclusion of, moral 
values as going to the essence of law. Obviously, strong pref- 
erences are often expressed in heated controversies. "Law", 
originating in religious conceptions, has an honorific connotation; 
hence the dissident and the subservient are apt to withhold the 
term from power norms which they dislike. But the indicated 
involvements do not free the social scientist from the necessity 
to examine enduring power orders, especially those constructed 
largely of customary law, where spontaneity and the tests of 
long experience predominate, with a view to determining whether 
value is an essential aspect of law for purposes of social science. 
This has led us to the third type of definition, namely, that 
providing an adequate description of positive law for the purposes 
of social science. For the social scientist the patterns, r6les and 
functions of law in society, the practices and effects exhibited 
in law or produced by law are as important as the normativity 
of the legal-political process. He approaches the data with 
the models of science and those of less rigorous social knowledge 
in mind, and he wants a definition of positive law which lends 
itself to congruent purposes. 
Viewed a priori, it may be thought that the theory of law which 
he adopts is not important because, in any case, the social 
scientist can investigate parallel or collateral factual and policy 
questions. However, there seems to be a positive correlation 
between the theory of law espoused and the kind of knowledge 
that is sought. For example, is it mere accident that many 
neo-Kantians have embraced logical positivism rather than social 
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science? Indeed, they have maintained not only that legal 
science must be rigorously separated from political and other 
social science7 but also that the sociology and the psychology of 
law merely confuse analysis by introducing unsound dualisms. 
In contrast, the natural law philosophies, where the separation 
of the idea of law from the why of it would be deemed irrational,8 
have made lasting contributions to the ethical criticism of 
political issues. And in legal sociology, where theories of the 
nature of law take account of the factual dimension or effects 
of law, it would be equally unsound to separate factual from 
policy problems and to enclose each type in a hard, isolated 
compartment. Because it has often done just the opposite of that, 
legal sociology has made important contributions to social science. 
Thus, it is quite likely, regardless of the bare logic of possible 
directions, that there is a positive correlation between the theory 
of the nature of law that is maintained and contribution to the 
political discipline. 
Perhaps the above observation will be disputed by pointing 
to positivists among political and other social scientists who are 
making important contributions but who have no theory of 
law or, more precisely, whose theory is that law does not exist. 
And what of the social scientists who seem to accept the theory 
that law is only a concept or a verbal form whose incidence in, 
or effect on, conduct, interpersonal relations, and institutions 
is merely accidental? The difficulty of assessing the conse- 
quences of such theories of law or non-law results from the fact 
that despite doctrinaire avowals, all of these scholars, just as 
did the American Legal Realists, assume the existence of actual 
functioning law (as norm) and its manifestations and effectiveness 
in very large areas of political life. They do not articulate these 
premises of their research and thus do not expose its incompati- 
bility with the avowed theory of law. 
Accordingly, it is possible to add relevance to many contri- 
butions phrased in terms of decision-making, the authoritative 
7 Hans Kelsen, "Science and Politics", The American Political Science Review, 
vol. 45, p. 641 (September 1951). 
. . .no jurisprudence can hope for adequacy which separates the idea of 
law from the idea of justice." Harold Laski, Studies in Law and Politics (New 
Haven, 1932), p. 259. 
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allocation of values, formal organization, power, or "control 
relationships of wills" by specifying the legal equivalents, as- 
sumptions and references that are implied throughout these 
studies. Clearly, however, no organized political discipline can 
be constructed so long as current nonlegal or antilegal perspec- 
tives operate. For, if legal theory which ignores the facts and 
values of political institutions is an affair of sheer logic and brute 
force, a political discipline which ignores law is apt to be an 
aimless speculation. 
The definition of the subject matter of the legal-political 
discipline in terms of distinctive normative facts has important 
implications for theory and research. It follows, for example, 
that both the representatives of a strictly descriptive science of 
politics and those of wholly intuitive knowledge of end-seeking 
are correct in what they affirm but in error in what they often 
reject. The opposition of the two approaches and types of 
knowledge is an artificial one because each is suited to different 
jobs and both are required to construct an adequate social 
discipline whose subject matter includes distinctive coalescences 
of fact and value.9 In sum, what goes on in legal-political 
processes is also, to a significant degree, what ought to go on. 
The theorist's functions thus include criticism of existing practices 
and evaluation of suggested reforms. It is equally necessary 
to describe the normative phases of political institutions in apt 
terms representing insights derived from a sensitive reliving of 
legal problem-solving by particular persons. It is also important 
to pursue more rigorous scientific methods, for example, to cor- 
relate legal-meaning situations with other significant situations 
and events. 
Other notable consequences would flow from the union of 
legal and political theory. Persistent interest in legal data 
would open vast areas to social research which, in the present 
state of world affairs, are the most important of all fields of 
social investigation. And, as regards the advance of theory, 
where else are there social data comparable to the legal materials 
in precision, abundance, continuity in many cultures, availability 
8 See the writer's Theft, Law and Society (Indianapolis, 1952), especially his 
discussion of the relevant social theory in the Introduction to this book. 
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of records and contemporaneous interpretations of what hap- 
pened and what was done? 
Second, the articulation of the legal relevance of political 
research would facilitate the progress of the discipline. Studies 
of administration are given direction and they find points of 
reference and standards in relevant rules of law-even when 
adniinistration completely flouts the rules. So, too, many far- 
ranging researches in communication, propaganda, political 
parties, voting, and leadership would attain definite theoretical 
significance if they were formulated in terms of direct reference 
to the sound legal solution of social problems, evidenced in 
legislation, adjudication, administration, and enforcement. 
Third, there would become available a body of legal concepts 
which could be of considerable assistance in social analysis. 
These concepts have in modern times been the principal interest 
of the Positive School. But there is no reason for their being 
so confined, for they comprise an ontology which has a very 
long history, and it would acquire new, more significant meanings 
if the legal concepts were thoroughly explored by social scientists. 
A juxtaposition of legal concepts, such as right, duty, power, 
liability, privilege, and political theories would stimulate specu- 
lation in promising directions, for example toward a nicer dis- 
crimination of power relations. 
Many of the most important concepts-property, crime, tort, 
contract, family, procedure, administration, public, and pri- 
vate-are discussed in Plato's Laws and their survival into the 
present indicates that they do not exist in a vacuum but are 
embodied in conduct and institutions which thus become dis- 
tinctive facts. A critical reexamination of nonlegal discussions 
of contract, property, liberty, and so on, in close contact with 
available legal analyses could be illuminating. Other basic 
ideas such as act, event, cause and sanction, and psychological 
categories such as intention, recklessness, negligence and ac- 
cident, have been critically explicated not only by Aristotle 
but also in a vast legal literature in the context of efforts to 
solve specific problems. It is not implied that this literature 
can in its present character be lifted into a twentieth-century 
legal-political discipline, but rather that its suggestiveness is of 
paramount importance in the creation of such a discipline. 
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Fourth, legal classifications represent important achievements 
in systematization, which is rare in social science. Placed in 
social contexts and interpreted imaginatively, these classifica- 
tions might provide the groundwork for organization of the 
legal-political discipline.'0 This does not imply that the laws 
in the books are always actually and fully represented in conduct 
and institutions. Indeed, the investigation of degrees of corre- 
spondence or divergence, of nullification, and of desuetude would 
become a principal function of the political discipline. Nor 
should it be assumed that the meaning of such basic conceptions 
as "contract" and "property" has not changed through the 
centuries or in relation, for example, to free enterprise and 
centrally planned economies. There is a dynamics as well as a 
core of fixed structure in legal meanings, and a cultural history 
of their evolution would be an important adjunct to classifica- 
tions of the data. 
Fifth, in studies of laws and legal institutions, whose contents 
and order exhibit unmistakable evidence of careful valuation 
and other thoughtful activities, it is practically impossible to 
confine theory to observable data and to generalizations re- 
garding them. Even a high degree of sophistication could 
hardly escape some notice of the purposes, uniformity and 
impersonality of law and the rational functions of legal procedure. 
No less prominent are the sustained efforts to achieve disin- 
terested resolutions of conflicting interests"1 although, obviously, 
that is not the whole story of law. Any formulation of the 
relevant value problems must therefore include the more subtle 
aspects of problem-solving, especially the sacrifice of some values 
in order to preserve or attain others. This implies the defense 
of "right law", not as a mere preference, but on objective grounds. 
It also implies the exclusion of behaviorism and crude opera- 
tionalism, although empirical investigation of the external aspects 
of legal-political data becomes especially significant precisely 
10 The writer has discussed this and related problems in "Some Basic Questions 
Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific Purposes", Journal 
of Legal Education, vol. 5, p. 329 (1953). 
11 "Law means precisely a judgment of right and wrong...." John Dickinson, 
"Social Order and Political Authority", The American Political Science Review, 
vol. 23, p. 616 (May-August 1929). 
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when and because they are viewed in relation to the nonobserv- 
able components of the normative subject matter. 
Three types of unification of political and legal theory have 
been suggested in the above discussion: (1) unification of the 
thinking of the theorist, exhibited in uninhibited investigation 
of legal-political problems, that is, investigation which does not 
assume that eternal verities are embodied in current allocations 
of certain data, ideas and theories to a particular discipline or 
specialty. Stated objectively, unification here is in terms of a 
problem. It means working with whatever knowledge and 
methods are relevant to the solution of a legal-political problem, 
regardless of present disciplinary labels. (2) Unification in- 
cludes organization of the knowledge, thus acquired. And (3) 
this unification looks finally to a reordering and classification 
of social science, rendered possible by the fact that the legal- 
political institutions and categories are the most inclusive of all 
social categories and institutions. The supporting reasons are 
factual and theoretical. That the legal-political institutions cut 
across all of social life has been frequently observed."2 The 
theoretical ground is supplied in the recognition and analysis of 
legal-political data as coalescences of distinctive form, fact and 
value. Since this means that all of science, logic, ethics and 
ontology, that is, all knowledge, is relevant to the legal-political 
field, the ultimate goal of the theorist who surveys that domain 




"Law, in a word, is a general mode of action which ranges over all places 
where a uniform rule is possible, and which touches, as it ranlges, every sort of 
thing...." Barker, op. cit., p. 82. 
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